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A FOREIGN POLICY FOR PEACE

If I talk seriously with you tonight, it is because the subject with which
I deal is deadly serious.

If I ask you to forgo for a few minutes the undeniable

pleasures of partisanship, it is because peace and war are matters which transcend
parties.

And it is of peace and war that I am going to talk--the hope for one,

the danger of the other.
At this moment, there is a small area in the Panmunjom sector of the Korean
front where no bombs fall, where machine guns and rifles are silent.

Sick and

wounded Americans and other UN soldiers have converged on this quiet area from
the prison camps of North Korea, their mutilations grim reminders that war is
not paid for in dollars alone but primarily in the blood, limbs and lives of
human beings.
And from the prison camps of South Korea, into the same area, has come a
steady stream of Communist sick and wounded.

The two groups of prisoners are

being exchanged in an orderly process in accordance

~th

agreements negotiated

by the UN and the Communist commanders.
Move out from the small truce area at Panmunjom and the picture changes.
All along the line, stretching across the desolate hills of Korea, the grim
struggle, now in its third year, continues.

Napalm flashes light up the night.

Machine gun bursts and rifle fire shatter the stillness.

communists kill, wound

and capture UN forces and, in turn, are killed, wounded and captured .
In one small sector of the Korean front, there is the promise of peace.
In the rest, the reality of war.
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I have drawn this contrast because it illustrates in a way the kind of
dilemma in which we and other peoples of the world find

ours~ves

in this

spring of 1953.
In our hearts, we cling to a small sector which holds the hope of a
durable meaningful peace.

The rest is flooded with the fear of war.

in our minds, one question predominates:

~nd

will the hope prevail or will the

flood of a third world war envelop it, not only at Panmunjom but over the
face of the globe?
This same question,
close of World

war

II.

in a sense, has been with us almost since the
If the answer were ours alone to give, I think we

would have long since given it.

But it is not ours alone .

The answer, the

final answer, is locked within the walls of the Kremlin.
I do not mean to suggest that we are absolved of all responsibility
in this i s sue of peace or war or that wP- must sit helplessly waiting for
the blow to descend when the Kremlin decides to loose it .

On the contrary,

what decisions we make or do not make, what actions we take or fail to take
are bound to influence profoundly the final answer that issues from the brooding political fortress in Moscow.
What we have done, the actions we have so far taken in the postwar years,
I believe, have already had an effect on the answer.

They have served to

restrain until now the forces of aggression from plunging the world into fullscale strife.

They have been instrumental in instilling in many free nations

the economic stability necessary to maintain internal order and to contribute
to the collective defense of peace.

They have helped to create, in short,

situations of strength in many parts of the free world.
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leadership, motivated by a deep sense of the responsibility that has fallen
to the United States and an inspired

~aith

in the future of freedom.

actions have so far prevented \o/orld War III--these

<~ctions ,

These

,and not vain

threats hurled across the ocean from the towerSt M' Ne r 'lo.Jro!t or the shaking of
fists from armchairs in Washington .
I am happy to report to you, tonight, that the President and the Secretary
of State have shown during the first

~ew

weeks of their tenures evidence of

continuing in foreign policy, in the same responsible vein as their predecessors.
Initial appointments in this field have generally been sound.

The removal of

the Seventh Fleet from partial duties in the Formosan Straits , which the
President ordered soon after his inauguration, was justified by the changing
situation on the Chinese mainland and on Formosa.

Let there be no mistake ,

however, about the purpose of the order that originally put the Fleet into
the straits.

It was not, as has been implied for purposes of politics, a

measure to restrain the National Government from launching military action
against the mainland.

The Nationalists were utterly incapable of such action

when the order was issued in 1950 .

On the contrary, it probably saved them

from complete annihilation by the Chinese Communist armies which were then on
the verge of launching an assault on Formosa.
In his first major foreign policy address after assuming office, his
speech of April 16, the President gave eloquent expression to the consuming
desire of the American people and of people everywhere, for peace.

That he

could make an address of this kind at all was due to the sound groundwork
l v- Iw'c
iCi·
2
Pliu
~ Qd
which had previously been laid. THe was able to speak for peace from a platform of strength, a platform supported by the military power of the United
States and the highest degree of unity ever achieved among free nations in
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nd in painting his plea for disarmacent in the bright colors of

a better and fUller life for peoples

he had before htc the model
~:4rrc;v~
bequeathed to all of us by the late great~ enator from Connecticut, Brian
eve~·here

MacMahon.
The President's peace proposal was well-timed and well-spoken.

Will

it lead, if not to durable peace, at least to an easing of the present
tensions which threaten to tear the world apart? The final answer, as I
have already suggested, must be
Panmunjom, but in Moscow .

sought~

not in iashington or even in

In dealing with the Soviet Union, t here are few

certainties; there are at best merely indicators.
Stalin ' s death has had only one certain effect:
replaced an enigmatic smile in the Kremlin,

To the outside world,
an enigmatic scowl has

But if that has been the only

certainty, there have been many indicators of far-reaching changes inside
the soviet Union and in its foreign policy.

Doctors are suddenly released

from jails where they have languished on false convictions of poisoning
high officials.

Soviet newspapers speak of an end to one-mao rule.

Abroad,

the peace feelers become too numerous and too insistent to be ignored.
Russians agree to discuss air safety over Germany .
invited to visit the USSR .

~rican

The

editors are

Truce talks are resumed at Panmunjom.

And finally ,

the Soviet press reacts with almost unprecedented courtesy to an address on
peace by the President of the United states .
That there is a pattern in these developments in soviet foreign policy
goes without saying.

But what does it signify?

Are the Russians sincerely

interested in a settlement of the issues which divide the world?

Or are

these recent moves mere feints to lull the west into a false sense of security?
Or are they designed, perhaps, to split the United

tates and

estern Europe?

Or could it be that all Soviet moves in the international arena at this time

- 5 are cloaks to conceal debilitating developments inside the vast Soviet
empire?
It is entirely possible that Stalin ' s death has produced schisms within
the sprawling Communist world and that they are spreading from the eastern
European satellites to the Pacific.

It may also be that the real successor

to Stalin does not yet sit upon the Soviet throne.

If this is so, then the

struggle for succession is likely to narrow down eventually to two men .
as

Just

Lenin ' s choice, Trotsky, was forced to give way to Stalin, so too may

Stalin's selection, Malenkov, yet have to yield to Deputy Premier Lavrenti
Beria.

Beria is master of the secret police and the atomic projects east

of the urals.

As Minister of tnterior, he rides the same road that has led

practically all of the present rulers of the Communist states through the
dark labyrinths of

the political

unde~iorld

to ultimate power .

Whatever the probability, one thing is certain:

Stalin's death

has

produced one of the decisive moments in the history of the 20th Century .

If

this nation rises to the demands of the moment, we may yet lead the world
out of the shadow of atomic annihilation into a new era of international
enlightenment and human progress.

If we falter, it is possible that the

delicately balanced international structure which presently houses not only
the heritage of freedom but the heart of civilization itself may be blasted
into historical oblivion .
We will not fail if we continue to discharge our responsibilities with
the same dedication and determination that we have displayed during the last
decade.

We will not fail if, in the international arena, we act with wisdom,

with restraint and with singleness of purpose.

- 6 We cannot know vith any certainty vhat is in the Soviet mind.
knov vhat is in our ovn.

We can

Speculations on what Russia vill do next may be

an interesting diversion, but they vill not lead to peace.

I believe we

can have peace or at least a measure of security in which freedom can live,
vork and breathe, only if ve are clear in our minds that, regardless of
Soviet gestures, ve must continue to build in the future on the groundvork
that has been ~id in the past.
must be done .

If ve vould have peace ve must do vhat

We must take the actions that must be taken.

First of all there is a need for a single line of authority in the
expression and conduct of our official foreign policy.
amateurs to stop playing at diplomacy.

It is time for

It is time for generals, retired

or othervise, to cease the unmilitary practice of grinding their axes in
public.

It is time, finally, to unify the conduct of foreign policy under

the President and the Secretary of State.

There are at present so many

official Americans and so many agencies operating abroad that the voice of
America seems to issue from a tover of Babel.

As a first step in ending

this expensive, dangerous and sometimes ludicrous situation, ve should dissolve the Mutual Security Agency and transfer to the Department of State any
residual functions it may have.
Abroad, ve must continue to vork tc perfect and to extend the many
instrumentalities vhich have already been established for maintaining the
stability and collective security of free nations.

These instrumentalities

are essential regardless of the intent of the Russian peace feelers.

If

these peace feelers are genuine, the NATO, the Organization of the American
States, the Pacific Security pacts and the United Nations are not impediments
to a settlement.

There is sufficient flexibility in all of them to adjust
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If the feelers are not genuine, then these links become

all the more vital to us and to other free nations.
We must not allow thest

positi~measures

for world stability to be side-

tracked by Soviet moves whose full significance we cannot begin to comprehend.
The Russians may be entirely sincere about a settlement at this time; they
may very well desire, for reasons of their own, a temporary easement of the
tensions between East and west.

It does not follow, however, that the long-

range struggle between freedom and tyranny is about to end.

And it is with

the realities of the long-range that our foreign policy must deal if it is
really to serve the needs of the nation.

The regional security arrangements

which have been so painstakingly devised during the past five or six years
are long-range instruments, not temporary toys to be picked up or dropped
at the whim of the Soviet Union.
The task before us, then, is to continue to extend the gains for freedom
which have already been registered.
must go on.

In Western Europe, the NATO build-up

A way must be found to reconcile the French and the Germans so

that the latter can be brought firmly and irrevocably into the Western world.
And a way must also be found to solve the deep-seated economic difficulties
of Europe.

We should continue to urge and to assist the Europeans towards

economic integration.

Beyond integration, the need is for trade not aid .

Only in this manner can we halt giveaways without at the same time inviting
Western Europe to turn east to trade and tyranny.
The policies of the present administration towards western Europe appear
to be growing logically out of the past and to be in accord with current needs.
There has been some dragging of feet in coming to grips with economic questions

- 8 but, on the other hand, the President's recent proposal to admit 240,000
additional refugees, if adopted, should help to solve the more acute problemn
of population pressure.
Similarly, policy in the Far East has thus far been a logical continu tion
of measures taken in the preceding years.

I have already mentioned the re-

moval of the 7th Fleet from the Formosan Straits.

I should like to stress,

however, that this action must not be the beginning of a descent which wil
lead us step by step after the Chin se Nation lists into the quicksands of
the Chinese mainland.

~~tever

course we

pursue with respect to the Far East,

and in the final situation there we can hardly predict that course, it is
most essential that we act largely in concert with other free nations.

For

the present, I do not think that we should allow ourselves to build unreal
hopes for easy solutions . baee& ga

&QA

exi&teat

a•••a~8

i&

~Maeea.

We

would do better to deal with the grim unfinished business in Korea.
The objectives which ve had in going into Korea, and which we still have,
were to preserve the South Korean Republic, to stop and to punish the aggression against t hat Republic.

By

stopping a local aggression we hoped to prevent

a general war later; by fighting in Korea we hoped to save this land of ours from
attack in the future .
What we did not set out to do in Korea, what we vere not required by any
mandate of the United Nations to do, vas to unity all of Korea by force.

The

task of unifying Korea, is a task for the Korean people themselves with whatever help may be given them by the United States.
do was to begin World

war

III .

What we did not set out to

- 9 We failed once to distinguish what we set out to do and what we did
not set out to do in Korea.

I trust that we shall not fail again.

In

November 1950, United Nations forces had pushed back a beachhead at Pusan
to the thirty-eighth parallel.
had set out to do .

At that point we had accomplished what we

He had met the aggressors, punished them severely, and

all but destroyed their armies .

The security of our forces made it necessary

to advance some distance beyond the thirty-eighth paralleL
When these forces bad reached the narrow defensible neck of the Korean
peninsula, some miles south of the Chinese border, I urged that we call a
halt to the advance and try to
and Korean frontier.

crea~a

buffer zone along the Chinese Manchurian

But in the mistaken belief fostered by faulty military

intelligence, that the Chinese Communists would not enter the war, that we
could "end the war by Christmas" our troops were sent probing, in dangerously
extended lines, towards the Chinese border.
The Chinese Communists entered the conflict .

We suffered a major defeat.

Some of those who just a few weeks before had been most vociferous in urging
our advance to the Chinese border began to press for two alternatives, and
they have been at it ever since, either the complete abandonment of Korea or
the extension of the ,.,ar all the '<ray into Manchuria and beyond.

This "get

in or get out'' extremism .rould profit no one but our enemies.
The recent exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners gives us some hope
that a truce may yet be negotiated at Panmunjom.

~le

should be prepared to

continue negotiations· oa- the basis of the Indian proposal.

of...;_t~1!t ye'M •

---we

ha.lfe-lrc-ceptea tba't proposal; --the Communists ha.Ye""not"':'-'When they are ready
te end the fight!ng, tbey vil'l acknowledge 'tft!tt· rnd1a

h~s

offered a solut.ion
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that

i~ botb-Ju~end honorab~.

carry out the

c~paign

~

troopshso that

In the meantime) the adcinistration should

promise to accelerate the training of South Korean

~rican

forces in Korea can be reduced.

I have spoken at some length of the problems which must be dealt vith
in Europe and the Far East for they are the principal keys to var or
Elsehvere in the vorld, however , other difficulties confront us.

~ace.

In the

Middle East, the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute , the Suez-Sudan issue and the
Arab-Israeli conflict must be resolved in a manner that vill produce cooperation and not bitterness among the parties involved.

Out of such solutions

will come the basis for a Middle East Command which can be linked with the
NATO in a continuous belt of defense stretching around the perimeter of
\-/estern and Southern Europe .
Closer to home , in Latin America, ve must act quickly to repair the
damage done to the

C~od

Neighbor policy by our neglect of this area.

Signs

are multiplying but t he communist infection which has settled into Guatemala
may be spreading to surrounding areas.

The time to stop the infection is now.

In this brief talk tonight , I have catalogued some of the problems

~ith

which our foreign policy must cope successfully if it is to lead to a genuinely
peaceful world.

We cannot expect the present administration or any ndministra-

tion to solve all of these problems.

What ve can expect, what we have every

right to expect is that this administration will continue to grapple with them
in an intelligent constructive fashion .

As long as they strive to do so, the

President and the Secretary of State have a right to expect in return our
confidence and support .

And they shall have it from us, not grudgingly and

reluctantly, but willingly as befits Americans who place country above party.

- ll I should like to return briefly in closing to the contrast that I drew
at the outset.

I spoke then of the small sector of peace and the long line

of continuing conflict in Korea .

I should like to say now that if the truce
the
that holds tenuously at Panmunjom spreads across/length and breadth of Korea,
I believe it may well mark the first major step of the world away from the
brink of the catastrophe on which it has tottered for too long.
I do not know what the outcome will be in Korea; the issue still hangs
in a delicate intricate balance.

I can only express my own feelings and yours

when I say that our profoundest desire, tonight, is that the step taken will
lead not into the long night of a third world war, but towards a new era of
peace for all mankind.

L
\

;ilt7l/-- /~?1.1'!1-f/l/

1. <-1/21/5:1

Mike:

line

On page ~ - in the third/ from the ia~s bottom there i s

the word "laid" --- in the original speech on page 6

they had the word •paid". We thought it should have been
laidxmd: instead .

